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1. INTRODUCTION
Acorrect definition of economic policies in general and monetary policy in particular requires a deeper
understandingof the characteristics and determiningfactors underlyingwagedynamics.When the ex-
change rate is no longer available to bring about adjustments, wage flexibilitybecomes a fundamental
requirement for ensuring an adequate adjustment to shocks, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical,
within a monetary union. Indeed, even though a number of reforms in labour markets have been put
into place in various euro area countries, there are striking differences remaining in collective bargain-
ing procedures and other labour market institutions (Du Caju et al., 2008). In addition, wages are also
an important determinant of firms’prices. Recent microeconomic research, both qualitative and quan-
titative, suggests that those sectors with a higher labour cost share, such as services, typicallyshow a
greater rigidity in prices (Fabiani et al., 2006 and 2007, Altissimo et al., 2006, Alvarez et al., 2006).
Against this background, the Eurosystem set up in 2006 a research network entitled Wage Dynamics
Network (WDN) aiming at study more in depth the features and sources of wage and labour cost dy-
namics in the euro area and their implications for monetary policy.
1 One of the lines of research of this
network consisted in analysing data from surveys among firms relating to their price and wage setting
behaviour. It is within this context that this article details the findings of a survey carried out by the
Banco de Portugal in the first half of 2008 within the scope of its participation in the WDN.
One of the main advantages of using surveys is their flexibility. There is the possibility of questioning
firms directly on a number of points relating to the way they set prices or wages, such as the main ob-
staclesto freezingor cuttingwages,the most important factors determiningwagesor the waystheyre-
act to significant changes either in demand or in production costs. This type of information, for
instance, cannot be obtained from large administrative databases such as the Ministry for Labour and
Social Solidarity Personnel Database (Quadros de Pessoal - QP) or the Social Security Wage Data-
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2 Quiteclearly, sur-
veys that are not conducted directly with the firms may well throw up a number of problems. These
relate both to the low response rate normally obtained and to the possibility of ill-judged interpretation
of the questions raised. Apart from this, the responses may be coloured by other factors, such as the
wayquestions are formulated or the economic outlook in which they occur. As a final point, this kind of
survey is not based on regular revisits, and this makes it impossible to create time series that allow for
an assessment of how the variables being analysed change over time.
This article is structured in the followingway. Section 2 describes some of the institutional characteris-
tics of the labour market that is being reviewed. The analysis is based on information from the survey,
and includes such things as the importance of collective contracts or the relative importance of the
so-called wage cushion in Portugal. There is also a comparison between the architecture of the wage
bargaining process in Portugal and the rest of Europe. Section 3 presents some stylised facts about
the dynamics of prices and wages in Portugal, as well as the link between the two. Section 4 looks at
the evidence on wagerigidity(real and nominal) and describes some of adjustment strategies used by
firms as an alternative to changes in base wages. Section 5 looks at the reaction of firms to different
types of shocks. Finally, section 6 sets out the main stylised facts that have been identified. Annex 1
details the process of sample selection, the questionnaire and the way the survey was conducted.
2. SOME ASPECTS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF WAGE
BARGAINING IN PORTUGAL
The institutional framework of wage bargaining plays an important role in determining the dynamics of
wages and, in general, of the labour market itself. Druant et al. (2008) show that labour market institu-
tions influence the frequency and timing of wage changes, while Messina et al. (2008), Babecký et al.
(2008) and Dickens et al. (2007) showthat the institutionalframeworkis also an important determinant
of downwardwagerigidity. In addition, institutions seem to influence the reaction of firms to shocks, as
suggested by Bertola et al. (2008), as well as the degree to which firms use available adjustment poli-
cies to reduce labourcosts. This is documentedin Babecký et al. (2008). There is in fact a vast bodyof
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assessment of short-term movements in the labour market. 22222 2
(3) For a summary of the recent literature on the subject, see Freeman (2007). 33333 3Inspiteoftheimportancegiventotheroleofinstitutionalwages,theinformationavailablefrominterna-
tionalsourcesis ratherscarce.
4 The surveythat wasproducedprovidesinformationonarangeof insti-
tutional characteristics that may influence wage decisions in Portugal, among them the degree of
centralised decision-making, collective contract coverage or the relative importance of contracted
wages. The main conclusions relating to wage institutions in Portugal are summed up below.
The wages of most workers, above all those in larger firms, are determined by in the context of collec-
tive agreements at the sectoral level. In around60 per cent of firms wagesare set through agreements
of this nature, although in only 30 per cent of the cases are the firms directly involved in the negotia-
tions (Chart 1).
5 Furthermore, 9.7 per cent of the firms apply firm-level wage agreements: in 6.9 per
cent firm-level and sectoral agreements coexist, whereasin 2.8 per cent firm-level agreements are ex-
clusive. As might be expected, collective wage agreements are more important in larger firms.
6 There
is little difference between the sectors analysed.
The share of workerscovered bycollectiveagreements (either sectoral or firm-level) is significant, and
it is considerably higher than the estimates for the union density. This phenomenon is frequently ex-
plainedbya simplefact: althoughin legalterms the agreements are onlybindingfor unionisedworkers
and firms affiliated to employers associations, the collective agreement is typically extended to all the
workersand firms in a specific sector. This can be doneon a voluntarybasis, or throughextensionpro-
cedures issued by Ministry for Labour and Social Solidarity. According to the Employment Outlook of
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Chart 1
FIRMS WITH WAGES SET UNDER COLLECTIVE
WAGE AGREEMENTS




































































































































Any kind of agreement
Sectoral agreements
Firm-level agreements (exclusively)
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
(4) The OECD has probablythe most comprehensivedatabase in this field. It provides quantitative information on an array of developedcountries relatingt o
the percentage of cover through collective contracts, unionisation rates, the importance of minimum wages and the degree of coordination and
decentralisation of decisions (see, for example,Elmeskov et al., 1998) 44444 4
(5) Unlessotherwisestated,alltheresultsshownareweightedintermsoftherelativesizeofeachfirmmeasuredonthebasisofthenumberofworkers.Blank
replies were excluded. 55555 5
(6) In the context of the analysisfirms were split accordingto their size into the followingcategories: i) very small firms (between10 and 19 workers); ii) small
firms (between 20 and 49 workers); iii) medium-sized firms (between 50 and 199 workers); and iv) large firms (more than 199 workers). 66666 6the OECD, in 2004, union density in Portugal in 2000 stood at 24 per cent (compared with 61 per cent
in 1980 and 32 per cent in 1990). More recent data, from the International Social Survey Programme,
published in the Labour Relations White Book, point to a 17 per cent rate in 2007. These figures are
considerably lower than the average percentage of workers covered by collective agreements as
found in our survey (Chart 2). The level of coverage is particularly high in the financial services and
tends to increase with the size of the firms.
It is worth noting, however, that the wage scale agreed in the context of collective wage agreements is
taken in many cases merely as a reference. Indeed, a significant number of firms pay wages above
those agreed under collective wage agreements (Chart 3). The difference between effective wages
and contracted wages, the so-called wage cushion (Portugal, P., 2006), is particularly high in financial
services.
7 Cardoso and Portugal (2005) estimate that the effective wages in 1999 exceed contracted
wages in amount that varies between 20 and 50 per cent. The figure obtained in the survey is 25 per
cent. From the point of view of the firms, the way this cushion is handled makes it a strategic buffer
against adverse shocks, in particular in a context where downward nominal wage rigidity turns out to
be an active constraint.
3. THE BEHAVIOUR OF PRICES AND WAGES: DURATION AND
INTERACTION
As mentioned before, one of the most robust facts coming out of recent microeconomic evidence
points to the fact that those sectors with higher labour cost shares tend to show a higher degree of
price rigidity. This in turn is frequentlysuggested as sign of greater wagerigidity. Business services – a
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Chart 2
SHARE OF WORKERS COVERED BY COLLECTIVE
WAGE AGREEMENTS


































































































































Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Chart 3
SHARE OF WORKERS WITH BASE WAGES ABOVE
THE WAGE SCALE




































































































































Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
(7) Financial services include the banking sector and the insurance companies. 77777 7sectorwherethelabourcost shareistypicallyhigh–areoftencitedasanexamplewherethedegreeof
price flexibility is strongly affected by wage rigidity.
The findingsfrom oursurveyseemto beconsistentwiththisconclusion.Ananalysisof pricefrequency
shows that around 70 per cent of firms do not change prices more than once a year; with percentage
being particularly high in the case of non-financial services (Chart 4).
Moreover, in non-financial services, unlike other sectors, there is a predominance of time-dependent
rules. Here, price revisions are typically carried out at specific moments of the year and, unlike
state-dependent price setting rules, they do not depend on current economic conditions (Chart 5). In
the presence of shocks, time-dependentrules typicallylead to greater price rigidity. Another wayof as-
sessing price rigidity, alternative to the more common approachbased on frequencyanalysis,is to find
out directlyfrom the firms whatis speedof pricereactionsto significantchangesin costs or demand.In
line with previous evidence, Chart 6 points to greater rigidity in non-financial services, with firms here
taking on average between 8.1 and 9.3 months to adjust their prices, depending on the type of shock.
This analysis excludes those firms that apply time-dependent pricing rules strictly which account for
about 25 percent of the total sample. The findings also show that firms appear to react more quickly to
positive shocks on the cost side and negative shocks on the demand side.
As a complement to this evidence, the survey looked into the link between the frequency of price
changes and the frequency of wage changes. The aim was, in particular, to get answers to the follow-
ing questions: i) how does the frequency of price changes compares with the frequency of wage
changes? ii) is there any synchronisation between changes in prices and changes in wages? and iii)
are there significant differences across sectors regarding the frequency and timing of wage and price
changes and their relationship?
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Chart 4
FREQUENCY OF PRICE CHANGES







































































































































From quarterly to half-yearly
From daily to monthly
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Chart 5
PRICE-SETTING RULES: TIME-DEPENDENT VS.
STATE-DEPENDENT PRICE SETTING




















































































































Time-dependent (under normal circumstances)
Time-dependent (strictly)
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).The approach used in the analysis of price change frequency was different from the procedure for
wage change frequency. In terms of prices, the firms were asked directly about the frequency of
change, while for wages the frequency of change was analysed through three different questions: the
changes stemming from moves in inflation, changes deriving from tenure and those related to other
factors. One composite variable was calculated for the three motivations, defined as the highest fre-
quency of wage changes for each firm, irrespective of the specific determining factor. Results show
that the wages of most workers (85 percent) are changed only once per year (Chart 7)
In orderto simplifythe comparison,a proxyfor the averagedurationof wageandpricespellswascom-
puted by simply multiplying each point category by its respective frequency. For those categories ex-
pressed though intervals the mid-point was assumed. Table 1 shows that prices in financial services,
construction and trade have short durations when compared to manufacturing and other non-financial
services. However, the results obtained for the financial sector should be interpreted with some cau-
tion, not only because the concept of reference in this sector may not be absolutely clear, but also be-
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Chart 6
SPEED OF PRICE REACTION TO DEMAND AND COST SHOCKS



























Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).causethequestionnairewasfilledinduringaperiodofturmoilintheinternationalfinancialmarketsand
this may have coloured in some waythe replies from the institutions concerned.
8 When compared with
the euro area as a whole, price spells in Portugal are apparently slightly longer.
As expected, the average duration of wage spells is higher than that of price spells (at around 2.5
months), and it also shows a smaller sector variability. When compared with the euro area as a whole,
wages remain constant for an average period that is around 2 months shorter. Druant et al. (2008)
show that the differences between European countries in terms of wage durations are significant,
though they are relatively slight in terms of sectors. The opposite is true for prices, where the differ-
ences between countries are of only minor significance, but significant in terms of sectors. These re-
sults are consistent with the evidence that differences between firms in terms of frequency of price
adjustments are determined to a large extent by their degree of competition and their labour cost
share, while differences between frequencies of wage changes is to a large extent a reflection of
national institutional factors.
Another equally relevant factor in the assessment of firms’ flexibility when they face changes in their
economic environment is the degree of synchronisationbetweenprice changes and wagechanges. In
order to obtain empirical evidence on this point, firms were asked whether changes to their prices oc-
cur without any defined time pattern or if, on the contrary, those changes occur largely in specific
months of the year. According to the information obtained, in 37 per cent of firms price changes are
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Chart 7
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More than once per year
Annually
Once every two years
Less than once every two years
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Table 1








Non-financial services 11.4 13.2
Financial services 6.8 12.1
Very small firms 9.6 14.6
Small firms 10.0 14.3
Medium-sized firms 9.4 13.8
Large firms 10.5 12.5
Memo:
Euro area 9.6 14.7
Sources: Druant et al. (2008) and Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
(8) As mentioned in the Annex, the questionnaire that was sent to banks was somewhat different from the base version. The biggest difference was in the
sectionrelatedto pricesetting. In particular, firms wereaskedto take as a referencepricethe interestrate appliedto theirmaincreditproduct,assuminga
customer with average risk. 88888 8concentrated in specific months of the year, and 64 per cent of these firms adjust their prices in
January (Chart 8).
Firms were also asked whether changes to wages occurred in specific months of the year or whether
there was no temporal pattern defined. The results show that the degree of concentration of wage
changes is considerably higher than that of prices, with 81 per cent of wages changed in specific
months of the year. January is the month with the largest number of changes. The fact that most deci-
sions on wages are made in January is probably institutional by nature, both at sectoral level and at
firm level, a reflection of collective labour conventions.
9
Firms were also asked about the possible connection between the timing of their price setting and
wage setting decisions. The intensity and direction of this connection is illustrated in Chart 9. The re-
sults suggest that there is some degree of synchronisation between the timing of price and wage
changes, with around 50 per cent of firms recognising that a link does exist. However, only 20 per cent
admit that the link is strong: in 7 per cent the decisions are taken at the same time, in 9 per cent
changesin prices are taken onlyafter wagesare set, and in 4 per cent changesin wagesoccur onlyaf-
ter pricesareset. In contrast, inaroundhalfof thefirms theredoesnotseemto beanylinkbetweenthe
timing of both decisions. However, the lack of synchronisation between the two decisions at the micro
level does not necessarily imply that the behaviour of inflation is irrelevant when it comes to setting
wages. As mentioned in Section 2, around two-thirds of firms take inflation into consideration when
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Chart 8
CONCENTRATION OF WAGE AND PRICE
CHANGES
As a share of all surveyed firms with valid responses;
unweighted results













81% of firms change wages in
specific months
37% of firms change prices in
specific months
Sources: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Note: Values computed as a share of all firms with valid responses. The sum of percent-
ages exceed the proportion of firms that change wages or prices in specific months as
they could choose more than one month.
(9) Thebigconvergenceofchangesinwagesinspecificperiodsoftheyearmayalsohaveanimpactonthewaythatmonetarypolicydecisionsaffectthereal
economy. Olivei and Tenreyro (2008) quote, for example, the case of Japan, where most firms fix their wages between February and May each year (the
so-called“Shunto”orgreatoffensive).Resultsshowthatamonetarypolicyshockinthefirsthalfoftheyear–whenwagesaremoreflexible–producesless
of an impact on economic activity than one towards the end of the year. 99999 9setting their base wages. In addition, survey results show that, among the several factors affecting the
frequency of wage changes, inflation is the one triggering most frequent wage adjustments in
frequencies greater or equal to one year (Chart 10).
The existence of wage indexation mechanisms is another factor affecting the way price changes are
transmitted to wages. The survey includes two questions that are geared to assessing the way the in-
flation behaviour is reflected in firms’ base wages. In the first, firms were asked if the issue of inflation
wasa considerationwhentheyset their basewages.If yes,theywereaskedto indicatewhetherthe in-
flation behaviour is reflected automatically in base wages, for instance through an explicit indexation
rule, or if it is used only as a non-formal reference for wage setting. Firms should also indicate if the
most relevant inflation for setting base wages is the past or the expected rate. Table 2 shows that the
wages of around 65 per cent of workers are set with inflation as a point of reference, though in most
cases this is done only informally. This figure is higher than the average for the euro area, though less
than in some countries, such as Spain or Belgium. In these, unlike Portugal, the bargaining systems
are characterised by strong automatic wage indexation mechanisms (see European Central Bank,
2008, for a summary of the importance of wage indexation in several euro area countries). On the
other hand, expected inflation seems to be more relevant in Portugal than past inflation. This goes
against the trend in most other countries, where past inflation is of greater importance (Druant et al.,
2008).
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Chart 9
SYNCHRONISATION BETWEEN PRICE AND WAGE
SETTING DECISIONS



















































































Prices set after wages
Wages set after prices
Sources: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Chart 10
FREQUENCY OF WAGE CHANGES











D u et oa n y
factor
More than once per year
Annually
Once every two years
Less than once every two years
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).4. WAGE RIGIDITY: EVIDENCE OF AND MECHANISMS FOR ALTERNATIVE
ADJUSTMENTS
4.1. Survey evidence on downward (real and nominal) base wage rigidity
The concept of nominal wage rigidity is frequently associated with legal or contractual constraints
whichhinder firms from reducing the wagesof their workers
10. In Portugal, there has been a legislative
framework since the 1950s barring firms from reducing wages, which would suggest a high degree of
downward nominal wage rigidity in Portugal.
The questionnaire contained two questions with the main aim of assessing the extent to which the possi-
bility of firms reducing their base wages or increasing them belowthe inflation rate is constrained by legal
or contractual factors.
11 The first of these questions, firms were asked if they would have considered the
possibilityof changingtheir basewages in2006(thereferenceyear inthesurvey) inanamount belowthe
one that was agreed. If the answer was affirmative, firms should indicate the desired change in base
wages. As a measure of downward nominal base wage rigidity it was considered the share of firms that
would like to reduce their base wages, while the share of firms that would like to increase their base
wages below the inflation rate was used as a measure of downward real base wage rigidity.
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Table 2
HOW INFLATION BEHAVIOUR IS REFLECTED IN FIRMS’ BASE WAGES
As a percentage of total workers in the sample










Total 1.8 4.8 15.4 42.7 64.6
Manufacturing 3.2 5.9 15.3 44.6 69.1
Construction 1.6 2.7 11.9 31.0 47.2
Trade 0.4 2.0 26.8 43.6 72.9
Non-financial services 1.7 5.9 7.6 39.6 54.8
Financial services 0.0 1.2 37.7 56.5 95.5
Very small firms 2.9 5.9 8.7 20.0 37.5
Small firms 4.2 2.7 10.1 18.6 35.5
Medium-sized firms 2.2 2.0 15.1 29.1 48.4
Large firms 1.6 5.9 15.7 47.7 70.9
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
(10) AcurrenthasbeendevelopingrecentlyintheliteratureontheissueofwagerigiditystemmingfromtheavailabilityoflongitudinaldatabasessuchastheQP
andthe BDRR. In the context of this literature,nominalwagerigidityis normallyillustratedthroughempiricaldistributionsof wagechanges,wherethere is
an almost total absence of negative wage variations and a notable mass of probability at zero (see Portugal, 2006, and Duarte, 2008). This restriction,
however,doesnoteliminatethepossibilityoffirmsreducingrealwagesinresponsetoadverseshocks.Allthatisnecessaryforthisistomakesurethatthe
(non-negative)variation in nominalwages is less than the expected rate of inflation. Given this, real wage rigidity is usually measured as the proportionof
workerswitha wagevariationrate closeto the expectedrate of inflation.In the absenceof realrigidity, the wagevariationof theseworkerswouldbemore
moderate. 1010101010 10
(11) These two questions were only included in the Portuguese version of the questionnaire. 1111111111 11Results show that a small fraction of firms would consider the possibility of reducing their base wages in
2006 if there were no legal or contractual restrictions. These firms account for 1.6 per cent of total em-
ployment in the sample (Table 3), with this share being higher in firms applying collective wage agree-
ments, in manufacturing and smaller firms. On the other hand, those firms that would have considered
the possibility of increasing their base wages in 2006 below the inflation rate in that year account for 4.4
per cent of total employment in the sample.
Following the pioneering work of Blinder and Choi (1990), Babecký et al. (2008) present an alternative
approach to assess nominal and real wage rigidity. In their work, and based on the information collected
in the common questionnaire developed in the context of the WDN, downward nominal wage rigidity is
defined as the share of firms that state they have frozen wages at least once in the past five years. The
hypothesis that is assumed is similar to the one used by Dickens et al. (2007), who assumed that firms
that freeze their workers’wage would, in the absence of nominal rigidity, be accepting a cut in wage. This
hypothesis assumes, of course, that those firms that never froze their workers’wages over the five years
prior to the survey do not consider the impossibility of reducing nominal wages as an active restriction. In
relation to real rigidity, the choice of an indicator is not nearly so clear-cut. Babecký et al. (2008) consider
as a yardstick for the real rigidity of wages the percentage of firms that accept the existence of an auto-
matic connection between the variation of their wages and inflation (past or expected). This is clearly a
measure that restricts the degree of real rigidityand, as such, anyfindings should be treated with caution.
The results showthat nominal rigidityis markedlymore prevalent in the firms under reviewthan real rigid-
ity (Table 4). These findings are in line with those obtained for the United States and for the United King-
dom, but different from those found in many euro area countries. It should be noted that the evidence
adduced for various European countries using these two indicators reveals considerable differences,
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Table 3
INDICATORS OF DOWNWARD NOMINAL AND REAL BASE WAGE RIGIDITY
As a percentage of total workers in the sample
Firms that would like to have their base
wages reduced
Firms that would like to have their base
wages increased by an amount





Non-financial services 1.2 3.1
Financial services 0.0 0.0
Very small firms 2.9 3.9
Small firms 4.8 6.9
Medium-sized firms 2.5 3.5




Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).both in relation to nominal and real rigidity (see Babecký et al., 2008). Nominal rigidity is, apart from Por-
tugal, particularly strong in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany and the Netherlands, while it is mark-
edly weaker in Belgium, Greece and Poland. Moreover, real rigidity is significant in Belgium and Spain,
countries where wage indexation is a common practice, in France and in Hungary, but not relevant in
Italy, Greece, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia.
The findings obtained from our survey show that legal restrictions do have an impact on reduction or
freezingof wages,but workers’moraleandperformanceare equallyimportant in a contextwherefirms
have to bring labour costs down (Table 5).
12
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Table 4
ALTERNATIVE INDICATORS OF DOWNWARD NOMINAL AND REAL BASE WAGE RIGIDITY
Percentage of total workers in the sample
Firms that have frozen their base wages at
least once over the last 5 years





Non-financial services 38.0 7.6
Financial services 0.0 1.2
Very small firms 11.9 8.2
Small firms 18.3 9.5
Medium-sized firms 18.1 7.7





Euro area 8.4 16.2
Table 5
MAIN OBSTACLES TO WAGES CUTS/FREEZES




Legislation and collective wage agreements(2) 3.58 Impact on firm’s reputation 2.93
Impact on workers’ morale 3.44 Risk that wages become little competitive 2.92
Impact on workers’ performance 3.39 Difficulties in attracting new workers in the future 2.83
Workers dislike unexpected changes in their wages 3.37 Costs of hiring and training new workers in the future 2.73
Risk that the best workers leave the firm 3.29
Sources: Babecký et al. (2008) and Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Notes: (a) Average score on a scale from 1 (“Irrelevant”) e 4 (“Very relevant”) weighted by the number of workers in each firm. (b) This factor is only relevant for wage cuts
(12) Results do not change by much when it is considered only those firms that, in the absence of legal or contractual constraints, would have considered the
possibility of reducing their base wages in 2006 or increasing them below the inflation rate. 1212121212 124.2. Alternative adjustment mechanisms
The importance of wagerigidityclearlydependson the availabilityof other mechanisms through which
firms can reduce their labour costs without changing the base wages. The information obtained from
the survey provides unique evidence on the relevant importance of those alternative mechanisms. In
this context, firms were asked if had at any time had recourse to ways of cutting labour costs without
changing their base wage. These mechanisms include the possibility of reducing or cutting out mone-
taryandnon-monetarybonuses,takingonnewworkerswiththesamecharacteristicsasthosewholeft
but on a lower wage, changing the shifts policy, taking longer over promotions or reducing the number
of employees. The firms had the chance to choose more than one of these options.
The resultsshowthataround70percentofthefirmshavealreadyusedatleastoneofthesestrategies
to cut labour costs, above all larger firms and those that apply collective wage agreements (Table 6).
Reducing the number of employees is by far the most frequently used alternative, particularly in finan-
cial services and in larger firms. Other frequentlyused mechanismsare taking longerover promotions
or introducing a freeze, and hiring workers at wages below those who leave.
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Table 6
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE LABOUR COSTS




















Total 20.1 19.2 12.8 27.6 24.0 56.6 70.5
Manufacturing 17.2 11.0 13.2 14.1 23.2 57.1 70.3
Construction 8.5 5.5 8.3 17.1 15.7 47.4 55.4
Trade 28.3 18.6 19.9 30.5 28.5 52.6 68.4
Non-financial services 16.5 22.1 13.9 26.0 20.6 53.2 69.8
Financial services 41.1 40.0 0.0 77.9 41.5 82.3 87.2
Very small firms 5.1 4.4 3.0 9.4 5.3 30.7 44.7
Small firms 15.7 10.2 7.4 14.9 15.5 40.4 57.6
Medium-sized firms 17.2 9.1 13.1 14.8 19.5 42.7 62.9
Large firms 21.2 22.6 13.0 31.8 25.8 61.4 73.5
Collective wage agreements:
Yes 24.0 24.1 13.7 27.4 23.0 63.4 75.2
No 9.3 6.3 10.7 27.9 27.4 39.0 58.7
Memo:
Euro area 20.6 - 21.4 25.2 38.8 20.7
(a) 63.5
Sources: Babecký et al. (2008) and Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Notes:The sum of each rowcould exceed 100 percent since firmshad the option of choosing more than one strategy. (a)The question asked in many surveys related to those workers
that left the firm through early retirement. Hence, the results are not directly comparable with those obtained for Portugal.5. REACTION OF FIRMS TO SHOCKS
The informationgatheredfrom the surveyalso made it possibleto analysethe wayfirms reacted to un-
expected and generalised adverse shocks. Three types of shocks were given: a fall in demand for the
main product; a highly relevant rise in the cost of an intermediate good, such as a rise in the price of
fuel; and a permanent rise in wages due, for example, to the renegotiation of collective wage agree-
ments. Firms were asked to put a value between 1 (“Irrelevant”) and 4 (“Very relevant”) on the relative
importanceofthefollowingfourstrategiesrelatingtoadjustments totheshockssuggested:i) achange
to prices; ii) a changeto margins;iii) a cut in production;iv) a cut in costs. The results are givenin Table
7 and theyshowthat, regardlessof the typeof shock, a cut in other costs seems clearlyto be the domi-
nant strategy. However, adjustments to prices and margins are also used, as opposedto reducingpro-
duction, whichcomes in as far less relevant, with the exception of demand shocks. In addition, shocks
to demandseem to be those that on averageaffect firms most forcibly. It shouldbe notedthat the strat-
egies used are not mutually exclusive. Firms may combine more than one, and the most frequent
combination is to cut other costs at the same time as adjusting prices.
Those firms where the strategy of cutting costs was deemed to be to be relevant or very relevant were
asked to indicate the most likely way to reduce those costs, having in mind the three types of shocks
and two skill levels. Firms could opt for one of six strategies: i) a cut in base wages;ii) a cut in the flexi-
ble components of wages; iii) a cut in the number of workers with permanent contracts; iv) a cut in the
number of workers with temporary contracts; v) a cut in the number of working hours; vi) a cut in other
costs. Other costs included advertising costs, administrative costs, or the costs of renegotiating prices
withsuppliers.TheresultsaregiveninTable8,whichshowsthatmostfirmsinPortugalputreductionin
other costs as the most likely strategy in almost all the scenarios set out. Firms also seem to differenti-
ate betweenworkersaccordingto their skill levels. Apart from cutting other costs, in the event of an ad-
verse shock on demand or on the price of a relevant raw material, firms wouldopt more for a cut in the
flexible components of wages for more qualified workers and a cut in the number of workers with tem-
porary contracts in the case of less skilled workers. Where there is a shock to wages, the relationship
between these two strategies and the level of qualifications is inverted.
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Table 7
FIRMS’ REACTION TO UNANTICIPATED SHOCKS
Adjustment strategies








Reduce other costs 3.7 80.9 3.1 71.8 3.1 68.4
Adjusting prices 3.0 64.0 3.0 62.7 2.8 58.1
Reduce margins 3.1 56.7 2.7 47.7 2.7 53.4
Reduce production 3.3 48.9 2.3 23.5 2.2 20.9
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Notes:(a)Average scoreonascalefrom1(“Irrelevant”)e4(“Veryrelevant”) weighted bythenumberofworkersineachfirm.(b)Firmsthatconsidertheshockasbeingrelevantorvery
relevant (as a percentage of total workers in the sample).6. FINAL REMARKS
Recent research points to the existence of a negative relationship between price rigidity and firms’ la-
bour cost share. In particular, empirical evidence based on microeconomic data shows that sectors
with higher labour cost share are those where changes to prices are less frequent. Other measure-
ments of price rigidity based on qualitative information presented in this article are consistent with
these findings. They include the frequency of price changes, the speed of price reaction to shocks or
the importance of time-dependent pricing rules. This evidence suggests that a deeper knowledge of
wage dynamics is crucial for a better understanding of how prices are determined and, in a more gen-
eral way, how the monetary policy transmission mechanism works. There are other factors that justify
the increasing interest in research in this area. They include the importance of the labour markets in
explaining the cyclical behaviour of the economy and the persistence of structural rigidity factors in la-
bour markets. Empirical research is fundamental for the definition of stylised facts on wage dynamics,
while theoretical research is important to adequately incorporate the behaviour of labour markets in
stochastic models of general equilibrium.
Based on a the information from a survey conducted by the Banco de Portugal in the first half of 2008,
this article presented a number of stylised facts on price and wage dynamics in Portugal. These facts
are summed up below:
1. A small fraction of the firms surveyed state that, in the absence of legal or contractual
constraints, would consider the possibility of reducing their base wages in 2006 or increase
them below the inflation rate;
2. Apart from legal and contractual constraints, the impact on workers’ morale or performance
and the risk that the best workers leave the firm are other important obstacles to wage cuts or
freezes;
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Table 8
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE COSTS: BY TYPE OF SHOCK AND WORKERS’ QUALIFICATIONS
As a percentage of total workers in the sample













Reduce base wages 2.0 1.2 1.5 1.2 _ _
Reduce flexible wage components 28.7 14.2 26.5 13.5 15.2 26.1
Reduce the number of workers with
permanent contracts 5.5 10.2 5.9 9.7 9.1 7.9
Reduce the number of workers with
temporary contracts 16.6 34.8 13.6 30.0 33.3 16.2
Reduce the number of hours per
worker 7.2 9.1 5.5 8.0 6.9 4.8
Reduce other costs 40.0 30.5 47.0 37.5 35.5 44.9
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).3. Firms frequently make use of alternative mechanisms to reduce labour costs, rather than
changes to base wages, with cuts in the number of workers being the most frequent form of
adjustment;
4. In many firms the wage scale agreed in the context of collective wage agreements is taken in
many cases merely as a reference, with a considerable percentage of workers receiving
wages above the amount agreed in collective wage agreements;
5. Most wages are defined with the behaviour of inflation borne in mind, above all expected
inflation, though without any formal rule;
6. Changes in wages occur less frequently than changes in prices. If frequencies are converted
into durations, it can be seen that the average duration of wages is 13 months – about 2
monthslessthanintheeuroareaand2.5monthslongerthantheaveragedurationofprices;
7. Sectoral variability of wage durations is significantly lower than that of prices. This is also
found in most European countries;
8. Changes to wages are more closely synchronised than changes to prices. 81 per cent of firms
concentrate their wage changes in specific months of the year (37 per cent in the case of
prices), with a very significant fraction making these changes in January;
Recent empirical evidence has thrown down a major challenge to researchers. New facts have come
to lightas a resultof analysinglarge-scalemicroeconomicdatabases,eitherquantitativeonesor those
based on surveys of firms. This should act as a spur for the scientific community to develop theories
that incorporate this new evidence in models of general equilibrium.
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Sample selection
The survey was carried out by the Banco de Portugal between September 2007 and June 2008 on a
sample covering manufacturing, energy, construction, retail and wholesale trade, transport and com-
munications, education, health, financial services and other business services. All told, there were 46
two-digitNACEsectors.There were4,850firms contactedtoparticpateinthesurvey.
13 Comparedwith
survey conducted in 2006 in the context of the Banco de Portugal participation in the Inflation Persis-
tence Network (see Martins, 2009), twice the number of firms were contacted and the number of sec-
tors covered was increased significantly, particularly through the inclusion of trade, construction and
financial services.
The firms werechosenfrom thoseontheMinistryfor LabourandSocialSolidarityPersonnelDatabase
(Quadros de Pessoal, QP). Given the prevalence of very small firms in the Portuguese production
structure, a pure random selection of firms would clearly have led to over-representation of
smaller-scale firms. To solve this, the survey targeted only firms withten or more workers.Data collec-
tionwassplitintotwostages.Forthefirst, itwasdecidedtoincludeallfirmswith100ormoreworkersin
the sectors mentioned above. This provided 2,756 firms. The remaining 2,244 werechosen on the ba-
sis of random stratification. The total number of firms was divided into three groups according to the
number of their workers: i) firms with 10 or more workers but less than 20; ii) firms with 20 or more
workers but less than 50; and iii) firms with 50 or more workers but less than 100. Grouping these in
the two-digitsectors chosen led to 138 mutually exclusive strata. The number of firms from whichstra-
tum was set on the basis of the relative frequency obtained in the QP for 2005. Once this figure was
reached, the firms within each stratum were chosen randomly. The final sample included 1,872 firms
from manufacturing, 25 from the energy sector, 657 from the construction, 841 from trade, 82 from fi-
nancial services and 1,373 from other business services, such as education, health, transport and
communications. In 2005, these firms represented around 35 per cent of total employment in Portugal
(Table A).
Structure and methodology for carrying out the survey
The questionnaire was developed within the scope of the WDN and was based on a set of common
questions for all 17 national central banks involved. This was organised in four sections, correspond-
ingto 39 questions
14. The opportunityprovidedbythe surveywasalsousedto includesome additional
questions,asawaytolookintosomespecificaspectsrelatedtothepriceandwagesettingpracticesin
Portugal, among them the size and importance of the so-called wage cushion (the difference effective
andcontractedwages),therelevanceof labourlegislationandcollectivecontracts aslimitingfactors in
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(13) There were 5,000 chosen, but the survey was only sent to 4,850 becauseit was found à posteriorithat some firms had merged and others had closed. In
addition, some firms that took part in the pilot survey were not includedin the final sample, given that the questionnairethey had received was different in
some ways from the final version. 13131313 13
(14) Acopy of the questionnaire could be provided upon request. 14141414 14wagebargainingandquestionsonpricesetting(basedonthe2004survey),suchasthespeedofprice
reactions following significant changes in costs or demand. An attempt was made to avoid technical
language in the questions so that as many people could understand them as possible.
After the sample was set up, in September 2007, a first version of the questionnaire was sent to 30
firms. As in 2004, the pilot questionnaire turned out to be very useful for an initial assessment of how
the project was received and whether it was viable. A number of firms were contacted on the basis of
the first replies and some questions were rephrased or cut out, making the questionnaire shorter and
easier to understand.
In October, a revised version wassent to all the firms chosen, together witha letter signed bythe Head
of the Research Department. The letter made it clear, among other things, that the questionnaire
should be answered by someone who was very well aware of the range of procedures underlying how
wages and prices were determined. More than one person could answer it, as long as there was an
overall consistency in the replies. In addition, there was a set of questions specifically for the banking
sector. This contained a number of differences from the base version, especially as regards the con-
cept of price in this sector. After receiving the questionnaire, the firms had 15 working days to send
their replies, which could be either paper based or through an Internet site specially set up for this pur-
pose.
15 In mid-January 2008, a reminder was sent to all the firms that had to that date not replied.
All the replies were received by June. There were 1,497 valid questionnaires received, a 31 per cent
reply rate.
16 This percentage was lower than for the 2004 survey (which had been 55 per cent), but it
was higher than original expectations, given that this was a more complex questionnaire, covering a
topic that was especially sensitive for some firms, as it is the case of their wage setting practices.
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(15) Ahelp line was set up for firms to request clarification. They were able to use telephone, fax or e-mail. 15151515 15
(16) The number of firms that sent completed questionnaires was slightly higher but some had to be ruled out, either because of inconsistencies or because























































In terms of the number of firms:
Total
By sectors: Memo:
Manufacturing Energy Construction Trade Business Services Financial Services % of total
population of
firms with 5 or
more
employees
%o ft o t a l
population
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Population 107 371 100.0 24 881 23.2 132 0.1 19 804 18.4 26 252 24.4 31 499 29.3 341 0.3 100.0 33.7
Number of firms [10 ; 20[ 85 133 79.3 17 251 16.1 67 0.1 17 361 16.2 23 499 21.9 26 831 25.0 124 0.1 79.3 26.7
[20 ; 50[ 14 899 13.9 4 904 4.6 29 0.0 2 443 2.3 2 753 2.6 4 668 4.3 102 0.1 13.9 4.7
[50 ; 100[ 6 109 5.7 2 308 2.1 27 0.0 763 0.7 917 0.9 2 018 1.9 76 0.1 5.7 1.9
[100 ; +[ 1 230 1.1 418 0.4 9 0.0 99 0.1 155 0.1 510 0.5 39 0.0 1.1 0.4
Targeted sample 4 850 34.1 1 872 38.6 25 0.5 657 13.5 841 17.3 1 373 28.3 82 1.7 4.5 1.5
Number of firms [10 ; 20[ 805 16.6 227 4.7 1 0.0 173 3.6 205 4.2 196 4.0 3 0.1 0.7 0.3
[20 ; 50[ 848 17.5 311 6.4 4 0.1 153 3.2 165 3.4 208 4.3 7 0.1 0.8 0.3
[50 ; 100[ 2 055 42.4 917 18.9 11 0.2 240 4.9 322 6.6 533 11.0 32 0.7 1.9 0.6
[100 ; +[ 1 142 23.5 417 8.6 9 0.2 91 1.9 149 3.1 436 9.0 40 0.8 1.1 0.4
Realized sample 1 497 100.0 546 36.5 16 1.1 202 13.5 260 17.4 440 29.4 33 2.2 1.4 0.5
Number of firms [10 ; 20[ 231 15.4 59 3.9 1 0.1 40 2.7 67 4.5 63 4.2 1 0.1 0.2 0.1
[20 ; 50[ 267 17.8 100 6.7 1 0.1 58 3.9 48 3.2 57 3.8 3 0.2 0.2 0.1
[50 ; 100[ 626 41.8 253 16.9 8 0.5 72 4.8 109 7.3 170 11.4 14 0.9 0.6 0.2
























































In terms of the number of employees:
Total
By sectors: Memo:








firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Number of
firms % of total
Population 2 504 479 100.0 699 962 27.9 13 936 0.6 330 646 13.2 471 042 18.8 914 257 36.5 74 636 3.0 100.0 85.2
Number of employees [10 ; 20[ 732 617 29.3 162 179 6.5 639 0.0 150 022 6.0 192 323 7.7 226 032 9.0 1 422 0.1 29.3 24.9
[20 ; 50[ 446 907 17.8 149 645 6.0 865 0.0 71 424 2.9 81 411 3.3 140 327 5.6 3 235 0.1 17.8 15.2
[50 ; 100[ 544 140 21.7 207 806 8.3 2 568 0.1 65 978 2.6 79 103 3.2 181 570 7.2 7 115 0.3 21.7 18.5
[100 ; +[ 780 815 31.2 180 332 7.2 9 864 0.4 43 222 1.7 118 205 4.7 366 328 14.6 62 864 2.5 31.2 26.6
Targeted sample 1 027 215 100.0 302 550 29.5 11 300 1.1 74 719 7.3 161 651 15.7 409 318 39.8 67 677 6.6 41.0 34.9
Number of employees [10 ; 20[ 10 274 1.0 2 984 0.3 10 0.0 2 189 0.2 2 568 0.2 2 487 0.2 36 0.0 0.4 0.3
[20 ; 50[ 26 555 2.6 9 864 1.0 109 0.0 4 689 0.5 5 188 0.5 6 463 0.6 242 0.0 1.1 0.9
[50 ; 100[ 243 839 23.7 109 727 10.7 1 317 0.1 27 274 2.7 37 122 3.6 64 634 6.3 3 765 0.4 9.7 8.3
[100 ; +[ 746 547 72.7 179 975 17.5 9 864 1.0 40 567 3.9 116 773 11.4 335 734 32.7 63 634 6.2 29.8 25.4
Realized sample 327 969 100.0 89 434 27.3 9 127 2.8 23 873 7.3 31 264 9.5 144 274 44.0 29 997 9.1 13.1 11.2
Number of employees [10 ; 20[ 3 037 0.9 805 0.2 10 0.0 523 0.2 857 0.3 831 0.3 11 0.0 0.1 0.1
[20 ; 50[ 8 308 2.5 3 182 1.0 30 0.0 1 718 0.5 1 485 0.5 1 783 0.5 110 0.0 0.3 0.3
[50 ; 100[ 74 006 22.6 29 811 9.1 935 0.3 8 194 2.5 13 184 4.0 20 258 6.2 1 624 0.5 3.0 2.5
[100 ; +[ 242 618 74.0 55 636 17.0 8 152 2.5 13 438 4.1 15 738 4.8 121 402 37.0 28 252 8.6 9.7 8.3
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
(continued)